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WHAT EXACTLY IS MARKET INTEGRITY? AN
ANALYSIS OF ONE OF THE CORE OBJECTIVES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION
JANET AUSTIN
ABSTRACT
One of the main objectives of securities regulation around the
world is to protect the integrity or fairness of the markets. This,
together with protecting investors, improving the efficiency of markets, and protecting the markets from systemic risk, form the four
fundamental goals of securities regulation.
However, what exactly is envisaged by this concept of market
integrity or fairness? Are these simply norms of behaviour incapable of further definition? Despite their importance, relatively little
attention has been given to these concepts in the literature. Do they,
for example, require securities regulators to just work towards
eliminating dishonest trading practices such as market manipulation and insider trading? Or should regulators be required to go
further and ensure, for example, transparency of corporate information, transparency of price information, and equality of access
to the markets?
Examining what is encompassed by the objectives of protecting
market integrity and fairness is critical for a number of reasons.
First, if they are only normative concepts, they may be incapable
of measurement. This is problematic because it may be impossible
to assess the progress of securities regulators towards achieving
these goals. In addition, if they are in fact incapable of further definition and measurement, then innovations which improve market
efficiency, another key goal of securities regulation, are likely to be
permitted even if the innovation in question actually detracts from
the fairness or integrity of the market. This is because improvements
in market efficiency are generally quantifiable, and, therefore, measured improvements in market efficiency create the momentum for
those improvements to be permitted.
Associate Professor, University of New Brunswick, Canada.
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This Article seeks to analyse the concepts of market integrity
and market fairness. It examines how they became one of the core
goals of securities regulation around the world. The Article then
attempts to break down these concepts and provide further definition
of them. It is hoped that this analysis will encourage the development of metrics that assess securities regulators’ performance, as
well as enable the assessment of whether or not new market innovations should be adopted.
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INTRODUCTION
Protecting the integrity or the fairness of the markets for securities is one of the key justifications for having securities regulators and securities regulation in the first place.1 For example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) stated mission is “to
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation.”2 Similarly, in Canada, the stated
purpose of the Ontario Securities Act3 includes “foster[ing] fair
and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.”4
The objectives of Germany’s Securities Regulator, Bundesanstalt
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (commonly known by its abbreviation “BaFin”)5 is “to ensure the transparency and integrity of
the financial market and the protection of investors.”6
The Oxford Dictionary defines fairness as “honesty, impartiality, fair dealing.”7 Integrity is defined in the Oxford Dictionary in
a number of ways, namely:
(1) The condition of having no part or element taken away or
lacking; undivided state; completeness.
(2) The condition of not being marred or violated; unimpaired
or uncorrupted condition; original perfect state; soundness.
(3) (a) Freedom from moral corruption; innocence, sinlessness
(b) Soundness of moral principle; the character of uncorrupted virtue; uprightness, honesty, sincerity.8

See About the SEC, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov
/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/J5VT-FJPP].
2 Id.
3 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.) [hereinafter Canada Securities Act].
4 See id. § 1.1.
5 See generally Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin]
[Act Establishing the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority], Apr. 22, 2002,
FinDAG I at 1310, last amended Dec. 6, 2011 FinDAG I at 2481, art. 19 (Ger.), http://
www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/find
ag_aktuell_en.html [https://perma.cc/5PFW-XUD9].
6 Securities Supervision, BAFIN (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www.bafin.de/EN/Die
BaFin/AufgabenGeschichte/Wertpapieraufsicht/wertpapieraufsicht_node_en
.html [https://perma.cc/FD6R-HRQQ].
7 Fairness, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2007).
8 Integrity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2007).
1
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With these definitions blending concepts of morality and honesty, “fairness” and “integrity” seem to be informal norms of behaviour, reflective perhaps of one’s own individual assessment of
what is honest or moral.9
However, these concepts of integrity and fairness are not used
by securities regulators in isolation.10 They are qualified in that
they are used in the context of constituting an achievable characteristic of a market for securities.11 Accordingly, it seems that integrity in this context can be confined to ensuring that markets
are “unimpaired,” “uncorrupted,” and “sound,” while fairness can
be confined to ensuring that the markets have the characteristics
of being impartial and equitable.12
Even contextualised in this way, it may be that the concepts
are still normative. Indeed, some have criticised the concept of
market fairness as being too vague and devoid of principled content.13 However, governments, securities regulators, and even the
G20 have adopted market integrity and market fairness as a core
objective for securities regulation.14 As such, it seems that these
concepts should be capable of interpretation, predictability or, at
least, contain within them some principles of general application.
In addition, consigning these concepts to the relatively vague
status of being informal norms of understanding that govern the
behaviour of individuals in society is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, as they are one of the core objectives of securities
regulation and one that securities regulators themselves strive to
For an attempt to develop a non-normative meaning of integrity in relation
to individuals and organizations see Werner Erhard & Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity Into Finance: A Purely Positive Approach 3 (Harv. Bus. Sch.
NOM, Unit Research Paper No. 12-074; European Corp. Governance Inst.
(ECGI), No. 417/2014; Barb. Grp., Working Paper No. 12-01, 2015), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1985594 [https://perma.cc/ZJP5-ENZC].
10 Id. at 3.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 4, 67.
13 See generally Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS
L. REV. 119 (2002).
14 The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 11–12,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/G20COMMUN1110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/453C-PCUU] (calling on IOSCO to make recommendations “to
promote markets’ integrity and efficiency to mitigate the risks posed to the
financial system by the latest technological developments”).
9
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achieve, how can anyone, including the regulators themselves, measure or assess their progress towards achieving this goal?15 Does
it also mean that securities regulators can intervene in the markets
with little or no justification except a bold assertion that a particular practice may be “unfair”?
Furthermore, if these concepts are incapable of further definition
and measurement, innovations which improve market efficiency,
another key goal of securities regulators, are likely to be permitted even if the practice may detract from what some may view as
the integrity or fairness of the markets.16 This is because improvements in market efficiency can usually be measured.17 For instance, an innovation in the structure of a securities market may
show a measurable reduction of the spread between the price at
which securities are offered for sale and the price at which the
same securities are offered for purchase.18 This reduction of the
buy-ask spread, referred to as an improvement in liquidity,19 enhances the efficiency of the market because it makes it more likely
that a trade will take place.20 Innovations that create efficiency
gains are likely to trump indefinite assertions of market unfairness because they can be measured.21 For example, recently there
has been controversy over whether securities regulators should
intervene to prohibit high frequency traders being able to co-locate
their computer servers with those of the exchanges.22 This is a
practice that can be shown to improve liquidity and, therefore,
market efficiency, but that also seems to create an inequitable
See About the SEC, supra note 1; see also Securities Supervision, supra
note 6; see generally Canada Securities Act, supra note 3.
16 See Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 5–6.
17 See Alex Frino, Vito Mollica & Robert I. Webb, The Impact of Co-Location
of Securities Exchanges’ and Traders’ Computer Servers on Market Liquidity,
34 J. OF FUTURES MKTS. 20, 26–27 (2014).
18 Id. at 27.
19 Id. at 28.
20 Id. at 28, 31.
21 See Janet Austin, Protecting Market Integrity in an Era of Fragmentation
and Cross-Border Trading, 46 OTTAWA L. REV. 25, 27–29 (2014–15).
22 See Scott Patterson, Hill Peers Into Market’s Fast Lane, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2012, at C4; Geoffrey Rogrow, Colocation: The Root of All High-Frequency
Trading Evil?, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/marketbeat/2012/09/20/collocation-the-root-of-all-high-frequency-trading
-evil/ [https://perma.cc/5DBU-JQ39].
15
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playing field because as a result of such co-location some traders
get market information a split second before other traders.23
The aim of this Article then, is to attempt to tease out what is
incorporated within these concepts of market integrity and market fairness and to differentiate them from other key goals,
namely market efficiency and investor protection.24 It is hoped
thereafter that further research can gradually develop metrics to
determine the impact of new innovations on market integrity and
fairness. Part I of this Article traces how market integrity and
market fairness became a key goal of securities regulation. Part II
moves on to survey how this goal is incorporated within the other
goals of securities regulators of five countries, namely the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia,
which represent over 50 percent of the world’s securities markets.25 Part III examines how these terms have been defined in
the existing literature. Drawing upon this examination, Part IV
delineates some of the core attributes contained within the market integrity and market fairness requirements. The article concludes by calling for more research to measure these elements to
better enable regulators to assess the impact of changes to securities regulation.
I. HOW MARKET INTEGRITY AND MARKET FAIRNESS BECAME A KEY
GOAL OF SECURITIES REGULATION
Market fairness seems to have started its course to becoming
one of the key objectives of securities regulation around the world
See Frino et al., supra note 17, at 31 (finding that allowing traders to colocate their computer servers with those of the Australian Securities Exchange
resulted in increased liquidity as measured by a narrowing of bid-ask spreads
and market depth); see also Patterson, supra note 22, at C1; Rogrow, supra
note 22.
24 See About the SEC, supra note 1.
25 All of these jurisdictions are in the top twelve in the world in terms of
market capitalization. Market capitalization of listed domestic companies,
WORLD BANK, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.4 [https://perma.cc/T6K7-M74A]
(specifically, in 2015 the United States made up 40.6 percent of the world markets in terms of market capitalization, the United Kingdom 3 percent, Canada
2.6 percent, Germany 2.8 percent, and Australia 2 percent (the United Kingdom figures reflect 2010 estimations)).
23
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as a result of the enacting of the Securities Exchange Act26 (Exchange Act) in the United States in 1934.27
The original text of the Exchange Act sets out the necessity for
the establishment of the Securities Exchange Commission and the
regulation of the exchanges and brokers.28 Section 2(a) of that Act
provided that regulation was necessary because transactions conducted on exchanges and over-the-counter markets are effected with
“a national public interest.”29 This provision states that regulation is necessary: “in order to protect interstate commerce, the
national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make
more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets
in such transactions.”30
The Act goes on to explain that regulation is necessary because
securities transactions and the prices of securities directly influence
the financing of interstate trade, international trade, and industry.31
The price of securities also affects bank loans when securities are
used as collateral.32 Furthermore, manipulation, speculation, and
unreasonable fluctuations of the price of securities adversely affect the volume of credit available to trade and industry.33 This in
turn impacts upon the level of unemployment, and increases in
unemployment burden the Federal Government.34 To this day, the
justifications for the Exchange Act largely remain unchanged.35
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934)).
27 See About the SEC, supra note 1.
28 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2.
29 Id.
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 Id. § 2(1).
32 Id. § 2(2).
33 Id. § 2(3).
34 Id. § 2(4).
35 In 1975, the objects were amended to add the words “to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities
and a national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto,” before the
words “and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and
control reasonably complete and effective.” See Securities Act Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 2, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act also changed the word “affected” to “effected.”
See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 985(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1933 (2010).
26
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Although this explanation of the need for regulation could be
read as merely setting out the constitutional underpinning for the
U.S. federal government to act, the objects of the Exchange Act
and the associated Securities Act36 reflect the historical impetus
for regulation at the time. These Acts were a key part of the socalled “New Deal” legislation enacted in response to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed.37
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress had two key concerns that necessitated this legislation. First, investors had been
cheated because of market abuse; namely, there had been widespread manipulation of stocks in the markets.38 Second, the Great
Depression had been exacerbated by a lack of investor confidence
in terms of returning to the markets after the crash, thereby, hindering the capacity of corporations to raise capital.39
Following the lead of the United States, during the latter part
of the 20th century, other countries also adopted market fairness
as a key objective of securities regulation.40 Today, market fairness is promulgated as a key objective of securities regulation via
the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO).41 IOSCO’s main policy statement, the Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation, sets out the objectives for securities regulation as:
x

protecting investors;

Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933).
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES
AND MATERIALS 2 (11th ed. 2009).
38 The House Report accompanying the Securities Act of 1933 examined the
decade after World War I and concluded: “Fully half or $25,000,000 worth of
securities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless. These
cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested
their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securities.” Id. at 2 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)).
39 See id.
40 For Japan in 1948 see Kin’yū shōhin torihiki-hō [Financial Instruments
and Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 1, http://www.fsa.go.jp/common
/law/fie01.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3K5-3QPU] (Japan). For Ontario, Canada, in
1994, see Securities Amendment Act, S.O. 1994, c. 33, s. 2 (Can.).
41 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 3 (2010), http://iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BX34-ES35].
36
37
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x
x

ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and
reducing systemic risk.42

The document also sets out thirty-eight principles which it states
are based upon the three abovementioned objectives, though it does
not state how each of the principles relates to each of the objectives.43
This key IOSCO policy statement, originally formulated in
1998, appears to be heavily influenced by U.S. securities regulators.44
This is because IOSCO itself was formed in 1983 from an interAmerican regional organization and, until recently, its governance
structure was biased towards regulators from North America.45
In fact, Kal Raustiala has argued that organizations such as IOSCO
are essentially exploited by the SEC to spread the “regulatory gospel” of U.S. securities law.46
IOSCO’s membership has grown and its members now cover
115 jurisdictions representing over 95 percent of the world’s securities markets.47 Since 2012, it has been governed by a board more
reflective of this diverse membership.48 Nevertheless, its core policy
Id. These goals may conflict, which could cause difficulty in deciding on a
regulatory solution. See generally Chester S. Spatt, Regulatory Conflict: Market Integrity vs. Financial Stability, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 625 (2010).
43 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, supra note 41, at 3.
44 Janet Austin, The Power and Influence of IOSCO in Formulating and
Enforcing Securities Regulations, 15 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 1, 14
(2015); compare INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, supra note 41, at 1 (“IOSCO’s current goals and priorities are first to identify and address systemic risks to the
fair and efficient functioning of markets.”), with About the SEC, supra note 1
(“The mission of the [SEC] is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets.”).
45 Austin, supra note 44, at 3.
46 Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
32 (2002).
47 About IOSCO, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco
[https://perma.cc/W33E-9RUC].
48 In 2012, IOSCO changed its governing structure to a governing Board.
The governing Board consists of thirty-six members, eighteen of which are from
the countries with the largest markets. IOSCO, RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENTS’
COMMITTEE ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE IOSCO BOARD, 1–3 (2013), http://
www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES49.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC3X
-6DUJ]. The other members consist of the Chair and Vice Chair of the Growth
42
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document, the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,
largely remains unchanged.49
IOSCO’s mission is to be the global standard setter of securities regulation, and IOSCO members have resolved to implement
and adhere to consistent standards of regulation.50 Part of IOSCO’s
strategy to achieve these consistent standards has been an evaluation process that tracks the level of implementation of the
IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation by each
country.51 Initially, IOSCO instigated this process by way of a
self-assessment exercise.52 However, in 2011 IOSCO established
an Assessment Committee to accelerate this evaluation exercise.53
IOSCO envisages the assessment process as key to working towards harmonization and has stated that it is designed to identify
and Emerging Markets Committee, the Chairs of the four Regional Committees,
two members elected by the Growth and Emerging Markets Committee and two
members elected by each of the four Regional Committees. Id.
49 Compare INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION (1998), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS
COPD82.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNQ3-9XRU], with INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N,
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), https://www
.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA2W-ZFSN].
In 2010, several principles were added as a result of the 2008 global financial
crisis. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, supra note 41, at 3.
50 See About IOSCO, supra note 47.
51 See generally INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD359
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z3M-L6WK] [hereinafter IOSCO 2013 METHOD] (guiding a self-assessment on the implementation level of IOSCO’s principles). This
2013 methodology replaced INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, METHODOLOGY FOR
ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS
COPD155.pdf [https://perma.cc/2US7-QVF8].
52 This self-assessment exercise asked each member to answer a list of questions in relation to each principle and to reach a conclusion as to whether the
principle was fully implemented, broadly implemented, partly implemented, or
not implemented. See IOSCO 2013 METHOD, supra note 51, at 14, 18–19. Alternatively, a member could elect to have the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) assess its compliance through what is called its Financial Sector Assessment Program. Id. at 14; see also The Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP), IMF (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/fsap
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CE7-FYKF].
53 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N ANNUAL REPORT 2011, 44 (2011), http://
iosco.org/annual_reports/2011/ [https://perma.cc/5VQW-AKKQ].
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“potential gaps, inconsistencies, weaknesses, and areas where
further powers or authorities may be necessary, and as a basis for
framing priorities for enhancements or reforms to existing laws,
rules, and procedures.”54
IOSCO therefore expects that once a member identifies gaps
in its framework of securities regulation, it will take steps to
adopt new laws to bring its securities regulation into line with
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles.55 It seems then that over time
it is likely that more regulators will adopt market fairness or what
seems to be its equivalent, market integrity, as a key goal for their
securities regulation.56
According to IOSCO, fairness is a broad concept, incorporating
not only the elimination of dishonest practices but also encompassing a need to promote equal access to markets:
The fairness of the markets is closely linked to investor protection and, in particular, to the prevention of improper trading
practices. Market structures should not unduly favor some
market users over others. The regulator’s approval of exchange
and trading system operators and of trading rules helps to ensure fair markets.
Regulation should detect, deter, and penalize market manipulation and other unfair trading practices. Regulation should
aim to ensure that investors are given fair access to market
facilities and market or price information. Regulation should
also promote market practices that ensure fair treatment of orders and a price formation process that is reliable. 57

II. HOW MARKET INTEGRITY AND MARKET FAIRNESS
ARE INCORPORATED WITHIN THE GOALS OF
FIVE SECURITIES REGULATORS
Although IOSCO is encouraging the adoption of market fairness
as a key goal, some countries, as demonstrated below, have placed
the emphasis on what seems to be a very similar concept, market
IOSCO 2013 METHOD, supra note 51, at 15.
Id. at 21, 24.
56 Id. at 11–13.
57 Id. at 11.
54
55
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integrity.58 Others stress the importance of the related concept of
market confidence.59
In the United States context, market fairness is the goal and
this is reflected in the wording of the Exchange Act.60 As such, the
SEC states that its mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”61
The Exchange Act, focused on the secondary markets, as originally
enacted had four basic purposes. First, it was to regulate the markets.62 Second, it was to protect investors through disclosure.63
Third, it was to prevent and provide remedies for manipulation
and fraud in the markets.64 Finally, it was designed to control the
amount of the nation’s credit that goes into the markets.65
In Canada, each province currently has a separate securities
act.66 In some provinces the goal of fostering market “fairness” is
clearly set out. For example, in Ontario, the purposes of the Ontario
Securities Act are: “(a) to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices; and (b) to foster fair and
efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.”67
The Ontario Securities Commission, which administers and enforces this Act, is directed by the Act on how to achieve market
See, e.g., About the FCA, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June 12, 2016), https://
www.the-fca.org.uk/about/the-fca [https://perma.cc/YFY8-6JC8]; Securities Supervision, BAFIN (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.bafin.de/EN/DieBaFin/Aufgaben
Geschichte/Wertpapieraufsicht/wertpapieraufsicht_node_en.html [https://perma
.cc/KR4K-GEQW].
59 See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 § 1.1 (Can.).
60 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 1, 48 Stat. 881,
881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934)) (“[T]o prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets”).
61 Investor’s Advocate, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www
.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/VKM8-VTLZ].
62 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 226 (3d ed. 1989).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Although this may change soon as some provinces move towards adopting
a uniform Securities Act, to be called the Capital Markets Act. See The Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, COOP. CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATORY
SYS., http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/about/ [https://perma.cc/2SX6-27EB].
67 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. § 1.1 (Can.)
58
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fairness. It is directed to set requirements for timely, accurate and
efficient disclosure of information, to restrict fraudulent and unfair market practices and procedures, and to set requirements for
the maintenance of high standards of fitness and business conduct in order to ensure honest and responsible conduct by market
participants.68
In contrast, the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC)
does not have a specific objective of market fairness or market
integrity incorporated within its Securities Act.69 Nevertheless, it
has determined that its mission is “to protect and promote the public interest by fostering … a securities market that is fair and warrants public confidence and … a dynamic and competitive securities
industry that provides investment opportunities and access to
capital.”70
In Australia, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act (ASIC Act) provides that the securities regulator, the
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), must
exercise its power to, inter alia, “(a) maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the financial system and the entities
within that system in the interests of commercial certainty, reducing business costs, and the efficiency and development of the
economy; and (b) promote the confident and informed participation
of investors and consumers in the financial system.”71 The emphasis seems then to be on market confidence and ASIC has interpreted
this provision such that one of its strategic objectives is “[p]romoting
investor and financial consumer trust and confidence.”72 Nevertheless, despite no mention of fairness within the ASIC Act, ASIC
states that another strategic objective is “ensuring fair, orderly
and transparent markets.”73
Id. § 2.1.
See generally Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.).
70 B.C. SEC. COMM’N, GOVERNANCE POLICY 4 (May 5, 2016), http://www
.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/About_Us/Who_We_Are/Governance/Governance_Policy
_May_16_2016.pdf?t=1466530708894 [https://perma.cc/M6XN-BR47].
71 Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)
(Austl.).
72 Our Role, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, (Apr. 20, 2016), http://asic.gov.au
/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/#priorities [https://perma.cc/75EQ-WZRE].
73 Id.
68
69
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The Act administered by the securities regulator for the United
Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), requires it to
work towards maintaining market confidence, maintaining financial stability, protecting consumers, and reducing financial crime.74
The FCA states that “[f]inancial markets need to be honest, fair,
and effective so that consumers get a fair deal.”75 It states that its
operational objectives are to “[p]rotect consumers ... protect and
enhance the integrity of the U.K. financial system ... [and] [p]romote competition.”76
Germany’s securities regulator, BaFin, frames its objectives as
“to ensure the transparency and integrity of the financial market
and the protection of investors.”77 Specifically, the Act that BaFin
administers and enforces gives BaFin wide powers.78 This includes
the power to issue orders that are appropriate and necessary to
eliminate or prevent undesirable developments that may be detrimental to the stability of financial markets or undermine confidence in the proper functioning of financial markets.79
It seems therefore that while some regulators set the goal as
market fairness, for others the goal is market integrity or even
market confidence.80 There also seems to be a degree of fluidity
between regulators in declaring that their mission is to promote
market fairness, market integrity, or market confidence even if
they are not specifically directed by law to consider these concepts
while exercising the powers vested in the governing legislation.81
The securities regulators referred to above also do not specifically
explain what is meant by market integrity, market confidence,
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, § 2 (U.K.).
See About the FCA, supra note 58.
76 Id.
77 See Securities Supervision, supra note 6.
78 See, e.g., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act],
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I
at 1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlich
ungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/WpHG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X].
79 Id.
80 Compare Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. (Can.) with Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2) (Austl.), and About the
FCA, supra note 58.
81 See, e.g., Our Role, supra note 72; Securities Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.).
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and market fairness.82 This may be because the regulator views the
concept as normative.83 Alternatively, it may be deliberate in order
to give regulators the flexibility to tackle a wide range of problems
under an umbrella of market fairness/market integrity/market
confidence. Of course, such flexibility is advantageous as it would enable regulators to easily justify that many issues fall within their
domain. However, leaving these concepts fluid is also problematic
because it makes the measurement of a given regulators’ progress
towards achieving these goals uncertain. It also gives rise to the
possibility of allegations of regulatory overreach.84
What perhaps is clear is that the regulators view the goals as
being similar and the concepts of market fairness, market integrity,
and market confidence as being intertwined.85 This is consistent
with IOSCO’s definition of market fairness referred to above and
a definition given by IOSCO’s Technical Committee of market integrity in 2011.86 In this report, the Committee defined market
integrity as: “the extent to which a market operates in a manner
that is, and is perceived to be, fair and orderly and where effective
rules are in place and enforced by regulators so that confidence
and participation in the market is fostered.”87
82 See, e.g. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.); About the FCA, supra
note 58; Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s
12BG (Austl.).
83 See generally Securities Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c, 418 (Can.); Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, last
amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I at 1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), https://
www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/Wp
HG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X]; B.C. SEC. COMM’N, supra note 70.
84 See, e.g., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9,
1998, BGBL I at 2708, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I at
1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen
/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/WpHG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X].
85 See generally id.
86 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 9 (2011), http://
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [https://perma.cc/42E9-X8NS].
87 Id. The same document defined “market efficiency” as “the ability of market participants to transact business easily and at a price that reflects all available market information. Factors considered when determining if a market is
efficient include liquidity, price discovery and transparency.” Id. See also a definition given in 2006 by a task force set up the Canadian Investment Dealers
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It is arguable then that markets which are “fair” also have “integrity,” and that this is what instils market confidence. Therefore, it
could also be argued that any structural adjustments which enhance
fairness also enhance integrity, which in turn enhances confidence in
those markets.
III. HOW HAVE MARKET INTEGRITY AND MARKET
FAIRNESS BEEN DEFINED?
The limited attention given to what constitutes market fairness and market integrity in scholarly literature is consistent
with the lack of regulatory definition.88
Within the finance discipline, market integrity is often discussed but not often defined. When it is defined it tends to be defined relatively narrowly, as a market where information is equal
or a market free from insider trading and market manipulation.89
For example, in 2000, Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk, Brian
Jorgenson, and Carl-Heinrich Kehr described market integrity as
“the disadvantages outsiders face vis-a-vis insiders when trading
in the market. We expect that market integrity changes over time.”90
This definition was given in the context of an event study measuring the incorporation of information into prices in a capital
market where insider trading laws were not enforced.91 In 2006,
Carole Comerton-Forde and James Rydge, in considering the
Association of Canada to examine Canadian securities regulation: “Capital market integrity can be thought of as a level of general confidence in the functioning of the market. Integrity is closely related to investors’ perception of the
fairness of the markets.” TASKFORCE TO MODERNIZE SEC. LEGIS. IN CAN.,
CANADA STEPS UP 29 (2006), http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/Volume1_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2HSB-M22J].
88 See generally Securities Act R.S.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.); Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, last
amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I at 1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.),
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Ge
setz/WpHG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X]; B.C. SEC. COMM’N, supra
note 70.
89 But see Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, Market Integrity and
Surveillance Effort, 29 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 149, 149 (2006).
90 Utpal Bhattacharya et al., When an Event is Not an Event: The Curious
Case of an Emerging Market, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 69, 72 n.4 (2000).
91 See id. at 69–70.
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market microstructure of ten Asia-Pacific stock exchanges, defined market integrity as “the ability of investors to transact in a
fair and informed market where prices reflect information.”92 In
2011, Donald Margotta stated that “[m]arket integrity exists
when stock prices are set in a market free from misinformation.”93
Such narrow definitions of market integrity conceptually link
it to market efficiency, in that a market of high integrity should
also be efficient because prices will reflect their fundamental
value.94 To finance scholars, the influence of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) leads to “a prediction that, in a[n] ‘informationally
efficient’ market, prices will reflect as closely as possible the asset’s ‘fundamental value.’”95 If prices reflect an asset’s fundamental value, this will result in the most efficient allocation of capital,
as investors will pay no more for securities than their inherent
value.96 As such, market integrity seems to mean eliminating
practices that may interfere with the ability of prices to reflect the
asset’s fundamental value.97 If all material information in relation
to a security has been publically disclosed, prices should reflect
the asset’s fundamental value due to the incorporation of all this
information.98
Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, The Current State of Asia-Pacific
Stock Exchanges: A Critical Review of Market Design, 14 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J.
1, 2 (2006).
93 Donald Margotta, Market Integrity, Market Efficiency, Market Accuracy,
17 BUS. REV., CAMBRIDGE 14, 14 (2011).
94 See generally Bhattacharya et al., supra note 90; Comerton-Forde &
Rydge, supra note 92; Margotta, supra note 93.
95 EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE,
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 53 (2005).
96 See id.
97 See generally id.
98 Using CAPM and ECMH, finance academics construct “event” studies:
the difference between the price of a security that has been the subject of an
abnormal occurrence and what it would have been without such an event. Id.
For example, as insider dealing is illegal, in theory prices before significant
announcements should reflect their fundamental value incorporating all publically available information. After the announcement, the prices should almost
immediately reflect their fundamental value by incorporating this new information. Id. at 53–54. If price movements are “abnormal” before significant announcements, this may be an indication of insider trading. Id. at 54.
92
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Michael Aitken has defined market integrity, in part, as “the
extent to which market participants engage in prohibited trading
behaviors.”99 Taking this further he and the Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre have designed empirical proxies and
systems to assist regulators in measuring the impact of their activities on market integrity, but only to the extent to which the
regulators’ activities impact upon the level of three types of prohibited behaviours in the markets they supervise: market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency conflict in the form of
front running.100
Behavioural finance academics Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman
also attempted to define fairness in the context of financial markets.101 While stating that it could be defined narrowly as equal
access to information relevant to asset valuation, they developed
a much broader definition by incorporating a claim to entitlements.102 Shefrin and Statman identified seven types of entitlements that they state form the basis of these entitlement claims.
These are:
(1) freedom from coercion (people enter transactions
voluntarily and are not coerced into or prevented from
entering transactions);
(2) freedom from misrepresentation (people are entitled
to rely on information which is disclosed);
Frederick H. deB. Harris et al., Evidence-Based Regulatory Policy Making
for Financial Markets: A Panel Discussion of a Proposed Framework for Assessing Market Quality, J. TRADING, 69, 71 (2011).
100 Id. at 69–70. See generally CAPITAL MKTS. COOP. RES. CTR., (Aug. 27,
2016, 10:05 PM), http://www.cmcrc.com/development/finance-tools [https://perma
.cc/CR9G-384J]; SMARTS Trade Surveillance for the Sell-Side, NASDAQ (Aug. 27,
2016, 10:11 PM), http://business.nasdaq.com/market-tech/market-participants
/SMARTS-trade-surveillance-sell-side [https://perma.cc/M3SL-PHEB]; B-NEXT
(Aug. 26, 2016, 10:21 PM), https://www.b-next.com/about/references [https://perma
.cc/SEM3-L64P] (noting that some commercial corporations provide surveillance
systems to regulators, securities markets, and self-regulatory organizations,
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IRROC), to monitor the
securities markets for market abuse).
101 See generally Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Ethics, Fairness and Efficiency in Financial Markets, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J., 21 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
102 Id. at 21–22.
99
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(3) information (people are entitled to equal access to a
particular set of information);
(4) equal processing power (people are entitled to a “competency floor” of information-processing skills, requiring
either compulsory disclosures or prohibition on information that may be misinterpreted);
(5) freedom from impulse (people are protected from
possible imperfect decisions);
(6) efficient prices (people are entitled to prices that
they perceive to be efficient in that intervention is permitted to correct imbalances); and
(7) equal bargaining power (people have equal power in
negotiations leading to transactions).103
Although not entirely clear, it appears that the source of Shefrin
and Statman’s entitlement claims were based on adopting a deontological view of rights as intrinsic and fundamental.104 This is
in contrast to a utilitarian view of rights as being derived from
that which results from the optimal overall welfare across individuals in society.105
This uncoupling of market fairness and market integrity from
market efficiency and the efficient capital market hypothesis is
more pronounced in a definition of fairness developed by Ian Lee,
a legal academic.106 His emphasis is on a much broader definition,
independent of any issues of economic efficiency.107 Lee elucidates
the meaning of fairness in the context of the securities market,
although his focus in developing a definition is on justifying the
prohibition against insider trading.108 Lee sees fairness as:
[A] brake upon self-interest. It is the normative basis for a variety of social conventions that prevent individuals from doing
Id. at 23.
See id. at 22.
105 Id; see also James J. Angel & Douglas McCabe, Fairness in Financial
Markets: The Case of High Frequency Trading, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 585, 592–93
(2013) (noting Shefrin and Statman’s fairness definition has been used in considering high frequency trading).
106 See Lee, supra note 13, at 141.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 140.
103
104
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that which would otherwise be in their own respective interest.
Some conventions that could be grounded in fairness might include promise-keeping and truthfulness, which many people feel
obligated to observe even where they might gain through deceit.109

Like Shefrin and Statman, Lee suggests that the normative
force of fairness may come from a deontological obligation to treat
others as equals.110 Alternatively, from the point of view of utilitarian and other consequentialists, the normative force of fairness
is a condition for the possibility of welfare-improving cooperative
action as a solution to the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.111
Lee postulates that the content of fairness will depend upon
the context in which it is used and argues that a market which is
attractive to engage in is that which contains an internal morality
characterized by fair ground rules.112 This is because markets are
cooperative institutions whereby resources are reallocated through
voluntary exchange, with the market respecting individual preferences and individual choice.113 Fairness-related rules are necessary for the market to be one which is faithful to its vocation as
a means of cooperative interaction and, as such, they must respect
neutrality and autonomy for all.114 Lee suggests that fairness requires rules which operate against coercion, deception, and dishonesty, and rules requiring those who have made promises to
keep them.115 Furthermore, Lee suggests that a fair market requires parity of information on the basis that exploiting a party’s
informational disadvantage is inconsistent with respect for another’s autonomy.116
IV. SOME KEY FEATURES OF MARKET INTEGRITY AND
MARKET FAIRNESS
It seems that the concepts of market integrity and market fairness may be equivalent. Both seem to require a level playing
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 142–43.
114 Id. at 146–47.
115 Id. at 147.
116 Id. at 150.
109
110
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field.117 Both are justified largely by referring to the need to maintain confidence and trust in the markets.118 As one of the main
ways in which capital resources are allocated within an economy,
the securities markets are critical to a nation as a whole.119 Therefore, it can be argued that trust and confidence in the markets is
critical to the welfare of a given nation. One of the key ways in
which securities regulators and securities regulation maintain
such confidence is to ensure that the markets are, or are at least
perceived to be, of high integrity or fair by market participants
and the public at large.120
What then is incorporated within the securities regulators’ responsibility to maintain market integrity and market fairness?
Whether or not these concepts are described as normative, it seems
clear that contained within them are some core components. Clearly,
it requires the elimination of market abuse practices whereby one
person has a discriminatory informational advantage over another.121 As such, securities regulation and securities regulators
must work towards eliminating market abuse practices, such as
insider trading, market manipulation, and front running. Eliminating market abuse can also be justified on utilitarian and efficiency grounds, as such practices interfere with the accuracy of
the prices of securities.122
117 Kristen A. Truver, Note, Cutting the Party Line: How the SEC Can Silence
Persisting Phone Call Tips, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 448–49 (2010).
118 See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Trusting the
Stock Market, 63 J. FIN. 2557 (2008) (finding that trust, defined as the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated, had a
positive and large effect on stock market participation as well as on the share
of an individual’s wealth invested in stocks. Also finding that cultural differences impacted the level of trust).
119 Carlyle H. Dauenhauer, Note, Justice in Equity: Newman and Egalitarian
Reconciliation for Insider-Trading Theory, 12 RUTGERS BUS. L. J. 41, 48 (2015).
120 James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1059
(1989); see also Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in International Contracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 647 (2001).
121 Bruce W. Klaw, Why Now is the Time to Statutorily Ban Insider Trading
Under the Equality of Access Theory, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 275, 333
(2016); see also Austin, supra note 21, at 28.
122 Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175,
184–85 (2010).
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However, it also seems that market fairness and market integrity incorporate ideas that are broader than just the elimination of
market abuse.123 As such, any definition of market integrity and
market fairness that is limited to the elimination of market abuse
or ensuring equal access to information is arguably too narrow.
The elimination of market abuse was one of the original justifications behind the introduction of the Exchange Act in 1934, but it
was not the only justification.124 As the Exchange Act states, the
markets are imbued with “a national public interest” requiring
the intervention of a government regulatory agency in the form of
the SEC.125 Furthermore, the powers granted to the SEC to regulate the markets were much broader than just enhancing disclosure and preventing market abuse.126 The original Act gave the
SEC powers such as setting the rules of procedure of exchanges
and the ability to suspend trading of securities.127 Over the years,
the powers of the SEC under this Act have been significantly expanded to include, inter alia, the regulation of tender offers and
clearance and settlement procedures.128
In keeping with this national public interest, it seems that
there is an argument that there are intrinsic rights from both the
perspective of individuals and the public that the securities markets will be fair if the public is able to access these markets, and
participants in the market will be treated as equals. This requires
that there be nondiscriminatory equal access to the markets for
all those wishing to trade.129 It also requires that markets be free
from coercion and that regulators facilitate the ability of all market participants to be able to trade their securities easily and at
the same cost.130
To ensure such equality there must also be transparency in
terms of the price of securities for everyone, which would include
123 Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP.
L. 849, 897 (2012).
124 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 1–2, 48 Stat. 881,
881–82 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934)).
125 Id. § 2.
126 See id. § 19.
127 Id.
128 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 62, at 227.
129 Patrick O. Gudridge, The Persistence of Classical Style, 131 U. PENN. L.
REV. 663, 691 (1983).
130 Lee, supra note 13, at 149.
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pre-trade information such as the prices at which securities have
traded, as well as the depth of demand and supply at each price.131
This need for transparency of pricing information suggests that
regulators resist markets for securities, such as “dark pools,” which
limit transparency and discriminate between traders in relation
to pre-trade information.132 Ensuring full transparency would ensure
that prices are accurate.133 This may also require that securities
regulators intervene if an event disrupts the accuracy of prices as
occurred, for example, during the flash crash of 2010.134
Ensuring equality of treatment requires that all participants
have free access, at exactly the same time, to accurate information
from issuers from which the value of securities can be determined.135
This would require periodic filings as well as information, which
would materially impact price.136
Protecting market fairness and market integrity by ensuring
equality does not seem to require “freedom from impulse,” as suggested by Shefrin and Statman, in that securities regulators protect
Nicholas Crudele, Note, Dark Pool Regulation: Fostering Innovation and
Competition While Protecting Investors, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. COM. L. 569,
579 (2015).
132 Id. “Dark Pools” are execution facilities where orders are entered but
there is limited order information displayed to some or all market participants.
See generally CFA INST. PUBL’NS, DARK POOLS AND INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY
AND MARKET QUALITY, (Oct. 2012), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb
.v2012.n5.1 [https://perma.ccWUC9-856D].
133 Jonas Monast, Climate Change and Financial Markets: Regulating the
Trade Side of Cap and Trade, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,051, 10,062 (2010).
134 See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 at 7 (2010), http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC
68-LWKR] (reporting that the “Flash Crash” occurred on May 6, 2010, when
the prices of many U.S.-based equity products experienced an extraordinarily
rapid decline and then recovered); see also Linette Lopez, A Trader Faces Charges
in Connection with the 2010 ‘Flash Crash,’ BUS. INSIDER, (Apr. 21, 2015), http://
www.businessinsider.com/a-trader-has-been-arrested-for-contributing-to-the
-2010-flash-crash-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/GV2K-HND6] (noting that the cause of
this event was manipulation by a commodities trader in the United Kingdom).
135 Monast, supra note 133, at 10,062.
136 See Tom C. W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34
SEATTLE L. REV. 325, 329 (2011). But see Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends?
A Critique of “Reverse Merger” Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L. REV. 475, 478 (2006)
(stating that there could be an “intermediate disclosure” regime that required
standards between stringent periodic reports and minimal disclosure).
131
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people from possible imperfect decisions.137 Whilst securities regulators may be justified in regulating in order to protect unsophisticated investors from investing in particular securities, this power
is derived from another goal of regulators, investor protection, rather
than the goal of ensuring market integrity and market fairness.138
Nor does market integrity and market fairness require regulators
to work towards enhancing liquidity or reducing transaction costs.139
Again, such regulations may be desirable but would be classified
as those that enhance another goal of securities regulation, namely
market efficiency.140
CONCLUSION
It could be argued that the concepts of market fairness and
market integrity have been used by securities regulators for too
long without sufficient analysis of what these concepts actually
require, while at the same time, without sufficiently distinguishing
them from other key goals such as market efficiency and investor
protection. Although such a stance may give regulators maximum
flexibility to deal with what they perceive as challenges when they
arise, this also gives rise to issues in terms of measuring regulators’
effectiveness as well as exposing them to allegations of excessive
use of their powers.
Whilst it may not be possible to definitively set out once and
for all what is encompassed by these concepts, it appears that at
their core is a requirement that securities regulators enhance the
ability of all participants to access the markets and to ensure that
participants in the market are treated as equals. As such, it seems
that market fairness and market integrity require:
(1) the elimination of market abuse activities, which are
behaviours whereby one person takes advantage of his
See Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of
Market Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 753, 789 (1999).
138 See S.M. Solaiman, The Enron Collapse and Criminal Liabilities of Auditors and Lawyers for Defective Prospectuses in the United States, Australia and
Canada: A Review, 26 J.L. & COM. 81, 83 (2008).
139 Lee, supra note 13, at 138.
140 See id. at 139.
137
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or her position to gain an unmerited advantage over another; this includes insider trading, market manipulation,
and front running;
(2) non-discriminatory access to the market for all those
wishing to participate;
(3) transparent and accurate information about the prices
of securities available to all participants at the same
time; and
(4) accurate information about issuers of securities
available to all participants at the same time.
Of course, market fairness/market integrity is just one of the
core goals of securities regulators. Regulators are required to balance this with their other objectives, namely investor protection,
market efficiency, and the reduction of systemic risk. This may
require trade-offs, and as such, market integrity and market fairness concerns may need to yield to these other goals. However, to
ensure a proper balance is made, a clear delineation is required
between each of the goals as well as a clear definition as to what
each of these goals encompass. Furthermore, to properly measure
changes and proposed developments and to be able to properly
assess and balance these goals, a range of metrics should be developed that is applicable to each. Significant progress has been made
in measuring changes in market efficiency. Some progress has
been made, and is continuing to be made, to measure changes in
market fairness and market integrity in terms of the level of market abuse. However, metrics also need to be developed to ensure that
the other components of market fairness and market integrity, as
set out in this Article, are also properly assessed by securities regulators in the exercise of their functions.

